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Abstract 
 
The main purpose of this study is to demonstrate the effect the reforms undertaken in the Romanian agriculture have had upon 
the revenues and the competitive edge of Romanian farmers. 
While, statistically speaking, the social and economic structures of Romania and the other EU member countries appeared to 
display a certain degree of convergence along some four decades towards the end of the previous century, the indicators of the 
past two decades reveal a wide gap between Romania and the EU countries, the fact being indicative of the existence now of 
economic, technical and institutional asymmetries and divergences, rather than convergences. 
At present, Romanian agriculture and Romanian farmers are at a strong disadvantage from their European counterparts in respect 
of competitiveness. In Romania, the economic and institutional mechanisms created over the past twenty years have most often 
favoured subsistence farming, leaving the door open to the added value to migrate to other sectors, which was to the detriment of 
agricultural production. 
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1. Preamble  
In the history of economic thinking, the concern of how to obtain an edge on the competition has been one of the 
main drives of any human action. 
Notwithstanding its limits in ensuring the way towards immediate and universal prosperity, the Ricardian concept 
of free exchange was a path-opener towards the conquest of a new world. 
The still "primitive" and "medieval" forms of pursuing profit in commercial activities made David Ricardo 
develop his theory of comparative advantage by way of free trade. This was happening at a time when England, in 
the midst of the industrial revolution, and seduced by the opportunities to import cheap raw materials, had abolished 
the Grain Act, sacrificing its own wheat production. 
Free trade met with a huge success, being considered a "universal theory", applicable to all countries, irrespective 
of their level of development, each country going to specialise in the production of goods for which it has a 
"comparative advantage". 
According to the theory, the money invested by the rich countries in the poor countries would have enabled the 
latter to purchase goods from the advanced states, and to repay the loans by way of exports. 
This theory was labelled as "hypocritical" first by the United States of America, and then by Germany. 
With the passage of time, free trade appeared in the guise of free competition, and the theory of comparative 
advantage made room to the theory of competitiveness and competitive advantage. Until the time came for the new 
terminology to be challenged and disputed with heated arguments pro and con, with the stress on the win-win rule as 
a substitute for the zero-sum rule. 
Without ignoring the substantive and rich number of arguments of researchers on both sides, our view is that the 
existence of an advantage does not exclude the existence of a disadvantage in relation to another person or another 
object. 
According to Pareto, an advantage for someone means not necessary any disadvantage for someone else. 
If we move beyond the static picture of these concepts, the dynamics of contemporary economies shows that two 
parties may each have, simultaneously, an advantage and a disadvantage in relation to something, and that we can 
exchange both advantages and disadvantages. 
Trade, economic, and financial flows have a meaning and can operate only running from a full place to an empty 
place; a liquid will never flow from a full vessel to another full vessel. 
In other words, imbalances trigger the flow of money/capital, goods, services, and labour. 
In order to avoid strangulation and stagnation, if we want to maintain balance, and to determine growth in a 
certain area, we need to accept the opposite somewhere else; overplentifulness in one geographical area/zone tends 
to overbrim, and seeks to find the place eager to absorb it. 
Competitiveness appears and when there is another one who cannot accumulate resources, money/capital, riches 
etc. Each trader will pursue the dual goal of preserving and enhancing its advantages, and of diminishing 
disadvantages by reinvestment and other various means, political included. 
 
2. The transition to a market economy and the advantages of Romanian agriculture 
Based on the economic principles described above, the manifest intention of the reforms introduced in the 
agriculture of Romania was to create, maintain, and extend the advantages/competitiveness of Romanian farmers, by 
putting in place the framework allowing farmers to make full use of the natural, agrotechnical, scientific, 
educational, and cultural resources, and to build up capital and investment resources, so that they should be able to 
compete on a free market. 
In practice, a first document issued in March 1993 – the 'Transition Strategy for Agriculture' – drafted under the 
guidance of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the PHARE Programme (Adevărul, 4 March 
1993), proposed a package of measures and guidelines that later proved to have brought no advantages to Romanian 
farmers, on the contrary, they worsened some of the disadvantages, and generated new ones. 
Among other things, the Strategy proclaimed that: 
 Self-sufficiency in the production of food must not be part of any political platform; it would be a mistake for 
the Romanian Government to strive to ensure self-supply of food, rather than allow production vary as dictated by 
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the comparative advantages; 
 Regulated farm gate prices, which include the subsidies, and the free market prices of farm produce should be 
lower (and they were significantly so) than the price of foreign produce at the border, which shows the strongly 
vitiated thinking behind the entire system of prices and subsidies; 
 Subsidies, in general, as an instrument of economic policy, are unfit for the transition to a market economy. In 
Romania, they caused an imbalanced distribution of food spending; for example, since 1989, the rate of individual 
consumption of meat and meat preparations has been significantly and constantly higher than the consumption of 
vegetables, sweetmeats, and edible oils; 
 The final target should be the elimination of all subsidies to agriculture, in the shortest possible time, so that 
prices should be formed under the influence of the market forces; 
 It is wrong to reduce the interest rates on loans to farmers, because this does not allow for a sound financial 
system to develop in the rural areas; 
 The first subsidies to be eliminated should be those for fertilisers and fodder; 
 Subsidies to interest rates on medium- and long-term loans should be stopped; 
 Government should soon move towards a positive real interest rate; 
 Consumer price control and general subsidies must be eliminated; 
 Land tax should be levied as soon as the methodology is in place; 
 Government must proceed to a fast and real liberalisation of prices, without eliminating ceilings altogether, 
such as for wheat, the price of which should be correlated with the reference price on the  international market; 
 Exact calculation of costs is not possible in practice … ; Romania spent too much on labour, which has 
consumed capital resources that otherwise could have been channelled to production; 
 The full and total privatisation of state-owned companies is critical for a successful transition to a market 
economy. Full privatisation was recommended for all agricultural and food manufacturers; 
 Fodder manufacturers should be privatised all at the same time; 
 Evaluation of agricultural companies prior to putting them up for tender or over-the-counter sale was not 
necessary; 
 Investors buying Romanian companies should not be constrained to comply with too strict conditions, such 
as: post-acquisition investment obligations, no- redundancy schemes, environmental protection, interdiction to sell 
land or other assets; 
 one half of the manufacturers of farm input should be turned private within the following three years, and at 
least two thirds of such manufacturers should have been turned to private hands within the following five years; 
 trading companies that provide services to the agricultural sector should be privatised as a matter of urgency; 
 Government should invest no state fundsprior to privatisation, leaving investment decisions at the discretion 
of the new owners (Ciutacu, 2001, p.232-233). 
The successive governments did their best to transpose these recommendations to specific legislation, and the 
effect were low competitive advantages for the Romanian farmers. 
3. Romanian farmers after accession to EU  
With effect from 1 January 2007, Romania became a member of the European Union, and took the first place in 
respect of the share of population working in agriculture (32.6% of all employment, a rate which is now 5 
percentage points higher than in 1989). 
According to Eurostat (European Union, 2012), in 2011, at an employed population of 2.9 million workers, the 
agricultural workers of Romania accounted for one quarter of all farm workers of EU27. The worked farm land area 
places Romania the sixth among the EU member states. 
The 32.6% share of labour working in agriculture generates some 6% of Romania’s gross domestic product. 
Agricultural production is highly sensitive to climatic and natural conditions: in 2005, the country produced 19.3 
million tonnes of cereals, in 2007 – 7.8 million tonnes, in 2011 – 20.8 million tonnes, and in 2012 – 12.7 million 
tonnes",(InstitutulNaţional de Statistică, varius edition). 
Between 1990 and 2012, livestock plunged from 6.3 million heads to 2 million heads of cattle, from 11.7 million 
to 5.2 million of swine, from 16.5 million to 10 million heads of sheep and goats, etc. 
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Relinquishing self-sufficiency, which went hand in hand with a diminishing demand for domestic products and a 
growing demand for imported goods, had as a natural consequence (as John Stuart Mill, 1920) himself observed as 
far back as 1848) a deficit of the trade balance for agrofood. 
  The agro trade balance deficit amounted to some 900 million euro in 2012 (of which, 500 million derived from 
the trade with Hungary, 340 million from the trade with Germany, 243 million euro from Poland, 104 million from 
the Netherlands, etc.). 
In addition to structural aspects that disadvantage Romanian farmers (the average size of farmsteads, crop 
structure, capital endowment, etc.), they are also disfavoured by the diminutive average subsidy per hectare 
allocated from the EU common agricultural policy budget, and from the national budgets. In 2008, for example, the 
average subsidy for the EU27 was 219 euro/hectare, as follows: 603 euro/hectare in Greece, 425 euro in The 
Netherlands, 417 euro in Belgium, 367 euro in Denmark, 324 euro in Germany, 319 euro in Italy, 289 euro in 
France, 229 euro in Sweden, etc., and only 38 euro in Romania (compared to 161 euro in Hungary, 143 euro in 
Slovenia, 135 euro in the Czech Republic, etc.). 
In this context, the real income of a Romanian farm worker rose between 2005 and 2012 by only 13%, compared 
to 95.9% in Slovakia, 69% in the Czech Republic, 64% in Hungary, 57.9% in Poland, 47.3% in Bulgaria, 44.4% in 
Germany, etc.(European Union,. 2012). 
The disadvantaged position of Romanian farmers and agriculture reflects in the pockets of Romanian consumers, 
who have to spend approximately 50% of their earnings for food. 
Although salaries in Romania barely reach 15 to 20% of the EU average pay, the price of food in Romania has 
risen to 65-70% of the average price of food in the other member countries. 
And a last but no less unfair disadvantage troubling Romanian farmers and entrepreneurs is the cost of and access 
to loans; the interest rate on loans in Romania is two to three times higher than the average rate in the euro zone 
countries. 
The very low level of salaries, the meagre domestic capital resources and capital accumulation, the cost of loans, 
the lack of employment opportunities, etc. are all responsible for the migration of Romanian workers to other labour 
markets, mainly EU countries, leaving behind a shattered economy that is less and less capable to sustain the 
elderly, and to finance an adequate educational system. 
 Under these circumstances, it is very hard to expect that the theories of comparative advantages, be they 
absolute, relative, competitive, or anything else should gain credibility in Romania. 
Conclusions 
 It is reasonable to say that the European construction, as it appears, and the integration process itself will require 
other theories and new instruments, tools, and practical methods, capable to provide sustainability to the European 
social cohesion. 
Any attempt to evaluate the effects of an economic strategy, whatever the level of its application – company, 
local, regional, national – must start from a set of questions and indicators designed to measure to what extent the 
strategy maintained and/or increased certain advantages, eliminated the/some of the disadvantages, or favoured the 
advantages of the competition. 
If the evaluation reveals that the effects translated into both advantages and disadvantages, then the next step 
would be to see for how many of the entities involved (individuals/entrepreneurs) the advantages have grown, and 
for how many of them the advantages have diminished.  
As far as Romania is concerned, it is difficult to answer such questions, both for the pre-accession stage and for 
the current, post-accession, phase. 
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